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Abstract— The introduction of new technologies and
concepts of operation in the air transportation system is
not possible, unless they can be proven not to adversely
affect the system operation under not only nominal, but
also degraded conditions. In extreme scenarios, degraded
operations due to partial or complete technological failures
should never endanger system safety. Many past system
evolutions, whether ground-based or airborne, have been
based on trial-and-error, and system safety was addressed
only after a specific event yielded dramatic or near-
dramatic consequences. Future system evolutions, however,
must leverage available computation, prior knowledge and
abstract reasoning to anticipate all possible system degra-
dations and prove that such degradations are graceful and
safe. This paper is concerned with the graceful degradation
of high-density, structured arrival traffic against partial
or complete surveillance failures. It is shown that for
equal performance requirements, some traffic configura-
tions might be easier to handle than others, thereby offering
a quantitative perspective on these traffic configurations’
ability to “gracefully degrade”. To support our work, we
also introduce a new conflict resolution algorithm, aimed
at solving conflicts involving many aircraft when aircraft
position information is in the process of degrading.
I. INTRODUCTION
Air Traffic Management (ATM) relies on several lay-
ers of technology supporting three essential functions:
Communication, Navigation and Surveillance (CNS).
Advances of the CNS technology base can directly lead
to improved air traffic management operations. And
indeed, the air traffic management system is left with
no choice but to leverage the concurrent advent of digi-
tal communication technology, satellite-based navigation
and overall improvements of available instrumentation
to adjust its ability to handle a fast-growing traffic
demand. The resulting Next Generation air transportation
systems is described in detail by the Joint Planning and
Development Office [1] for US operations, and by the
SESAR Consortium [2], [3] for European operations.
For example, one of the cornerstones of expanded
operations is ADS-B, a navigation and surveillance
concept based on the GPS satellite positioning system
which offers the potential for giving pilots more flight
autonomy during the en-route flight phase and enabling
higher and more flexible traffic densities in terminal
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areas. One of the main benefits of ADS-B is to improve
navigation precision by providing an accurate position
fix. Such technology also enables so-called trajectory-
based operations (TBOs), and strategic traffic separation
management using the concept of 4-dimensional trajec-
tories (4DTs), whereby an aircraft is able to forecast
and broadcast its intended trajectory well before its
execution.
However, the obligation for the ATM system to main-
tain very high reliability and safety levels implies that
such new system technologies can be implemented only
if they lead to a system with equal or better safety
characteristics than currently demonstrated. While sys-
tem safety includes the ability for the system to operate
well under nominal conditions, it is also concerned with
off-nominal system behaviors, whereby operations are
expected to still remain accident-free for all known
failure modes of the system. Failures may affect several
parts of the ATM infrastructure:
• ATM computational infrastructure: Computers
and communication systems (both ground-based
and airborne) form the backbone of the air trans-
portation system information infrastructure. Com-
puters are not exempt from such failures, whether
the failures involve hardware (motherboard and
wiring) or software (incomplete functional require-
ments or erroneous software implementation).
• Communications: A communication mishap can
lead to severe consequences. Most lately, on
September 25th, 2007, a communication failure
at Memphis’ Air Route Traffic Control Center
(ARTCC) shut down many phone lines, radio com-
munications and radar coverage, completely inca-
pacitating operations for a period of two hours, and
despite the presence of about 200 aircraft in the
center.
• Surveillance: Computer or radar failures can cause
surveillance failures. For instance, in December
2000, Miami International airport was subject to
repeated radar failures when erroneous flight in-
formation data appeared on the controllers’ screen.
During one such mishap, about 125 flights were
rerouted, affecting traffic all over the US.
• Operations: For current operation degraded modes,
there exist backup procedures described by ICAO in
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2[4]. Also, issues in closely-spaced parallel runway
operations is the object of several papers [5], [6].
An analysis of current en route air traffic control
usage during special situations can be found in [7].
Operation failures can lead to accidents such as the
2002 crash over Germany between a Russian pas-
senger jet and a cargo plane. Contradictory orders
provided by the Traffic Collision Avoidance System
(TCAS) and the controller lead to a collision.
• Vehicles: An intruder can enter the airspace and
consequently, jeopardize the safety of surrounding
traffic. A private plane can unintentionally get too
close to a restricted airspace such as the vicinity
of major airports. If a VFR (Visual Flight Rules)
aircraft gets in the landing path of IFR (Instrument
Flight Rules) flights, this generates an abnormal
situation to be solved by the controller.
• Airport closure: An airport or part of it can
be closed, e.g for weather conditions. The traffic
needs to be reorganized and rerouted towards other
airports. For instance, Bangor International Airport
is often a diversion destination when freezing rain,
snow and fog close Boston, New York or other
major Northeast metropolitan centers.
In the past, such failure modes and how to recover
from them have been identified on an ad hoc basis,
whereby accidents have triggered extensive studies and
redesigns of the air traffic management operations. Ex-
tensive experience about incidents by air traffic con-
trollers has progressively led them to always address
“what if” questions during routine operations, leading
them to safe operations. This system comes complete
with degraded operation and recovery procedures, such
as those described in [4]. One example of such fault-
tolerant, or fail-safe procedure concerns departure oper-
ations: A safe, collision-free path is completely specified
to the aircraft prior to take-off, in such a way that the
aircraft may follow this path safely even in the case of
complete communication failure during take-off.
ADS-B, digital communication technology and ad-
vanced automation will enhance higher density airborne
operations in the proximity of busy airports, en-route
or terminal airspace operations with flexible routes,
or cockpit-centric, decentralized conflict management.
Those future evolutions of the system will need to be
proven fully safe prior to their introduction within the
operational landscape. All failure modes will need to be
identified and shown to be handled safely prior to the
new procedures implementation.
Within this paper, the process by which the current
or future system keeps operating safely despite degrada-
tion of the sustaining CNS infrastructure will be called
“Graceful Degradation”. The term “Graceful Degrada-
tion” finds its origins in complex computer systems [8].
However, it can be immediately extended to overall
systems such as the National Airspace System (NAS),
which include both physical assets (airplanes) and com-
plex information infrastructures. The examination of
concepts of operation such as NextGen in the US [1] and
SESAR [2], [3] in Europe reveals that system safety and
graceful degradation are considered open research issues
for most future operations. Tables 1 and 2 present some
of the Research and Development topics for SESAR and
NextGen, respectively. In many regards, the works that
most closely relate to the present paper are those devoted
to traffic and airspace complexity [9], [10], [11], [12],
[13], [14]. Indeed, these also aim at evaluating, in a broad
sense, the resilience of ongoing controlled traffic against
off-nominal events.
No Research topic
15 Study of the following automation topics: Automated
separation tools and safety, impact of automation on ca-
pacity and impact of loss of situation awareness and tools
to manage exceptions associated with loss of situation
awareness.
16 Evaluation of ground based de-confliction automation
support tools with particular focus on how to ensure
feasible solutions with a minimum of constraints on the
users trajectory.
41 Evaluation of terminal route structure design involving
alternative arrival techniques with multiple or single
merging points.
42 Evaluation of Time Based Separation (TBS) on merging
points focussing on accuracy requirements and benefits.
49 Study on dynamic risk modelling and management tech-
niques for on-line measurement of safety risk. Study on
the assessment of the overall safety of the CONOPS.
For now, it is not obvious that the concepts ideas all
together are safe in principal (as stated e.g. in Episode
3 objectives).
51 Model complex scenarios of new trajectory based ar-
rival/departure techniques plus existing SID/STAR and
also with the SID/STAR from nearby airports plus transit
traffic
54 Study controller acceptability of ASAS Spacing versus
ASAS Separation during the organization of streams of
traffic
62 Development, evaluation and agreement on separation
minima for each separation method included in the
concept
64 The new separation modes described at least Dynamic
Route Allocation, 4D Contracts and ASAS-Self Separa-
tion in mixed mode environment shall be assessed with
regard to maturity and potential performance: New sep-
aration modes shall be assessed with regard to maturity
and potential performance: The robustness and stability
of the various methods in the face of unexpected events
(even of small magnitude) is to be investigated.
80 Elaboration of high density separation concepts and asso-
ciated airspace issues in terms of detail procedures which
should be then validated with a focus on feasibility.
TABLE 1: SESAR R&D topics [3]
In this paper, we are interested in analyzing the con-
ditions for the graceful degradation of high-density traf-
fic when the positioning system substantially degrades.
3The motivation behind our work is the widespread
and growing implementation of GPS-based ADS-B as
a replacement for other, conventional navigation and
surveillance mechanisms such as secondary radar and
beacon-based positioning systems. Such development
offers the potential for enabling higher traffic densities in
the vicinity of large and busy airports, enabling “super-
density operations”[1]. For that purpose, the remainder
of this paper is organized as follows: First, we state
the graceful degradation problem in the context of high
traffic densities and failing navigation systems. Then,
an algorithm of avoidance under uncertainties is used
to compare the ability for Miles In Trail and Free
flight configurations to manage a loss of accuracy in
the positioning system. The avoidance process under
uncertainties is analyzed. The algorithm is presented in
appendix.
II. GRACEFUL DEGRADATION OF SURVEILLANCE
AND NAVIGATION SYSTEMS
This paper focuses on the impact of surveillance and
navigation system degradation on aircraft separation re-
quirements. Indeed, the primary mission of the air traffic
control system is to ensure safe aircraft separation under
all regular and degraded circumstances. Conventional
surveillance include radar-based technology, such as pri-
mary and secondary radars, and ground-based beacons.
New, higher-resolution surveillance systems are enabled
by satellite-based positioning systems. Such technologies
may enable reduced horizontal separation minima and
therefore higher airborne aircraft densities.
We may then formulate the following questions:
1) Analysis: Graceful degradation sensitivity. Con-
sider a given air traffic situation (consisting of a
number of aircraft with given positions, velocities
and headings), what is the “sensitivity” of this
situation relative to a sudden degradation of the
surveillance system?
2) Design: Graceful degradation-compatible guid-
ance. Consider a set of aircraft with given origins
and destinations. Find a sequence of aircraft head-
ings such that the graceful degradation sensitivity
of the overall traffic of interest remains below a
given threshold.
In this paper, we will be concerned with the analysis
question, leaving the design question for further research.
The principle that will drive our analysis can be sketched
as follows: Considering a set of aircraft operating under
a “high performance” surveillance system, we analyze
whether safety can be maintained despite a failure of
the surveillance system. Assuming that failures of the
surveillance system consist of a partial loss of vehicle
coverage, we will be interested in what maneuvers will
Fig. 1: Super-Density operations [1]
allow aircraft to remain provably separated. Indeed,
partial or complete loss of aircraft position coverage
results in growing uncertainty about aircraft positions,
in such a way that aircraft initially close to each other
may not be distinguishable from each other shortly
after the failure, unless they maneuver to augment their
physical separation. Thus, underpinning our analysis of
the the ability for a particular airborne configuration to
gracefully degrade, we find the necessity to design pro-
cedures enabling traffic to maintain provable separation
under degraded conditions. In this paper, such procedure
will consist of a novel aircraft conflict management
algorithm.
Considering a planar traffic environment for simplic-
ity, we introduce the following definitions:
1) Nominal operations: Nominal operations consist
of all allowable aircraft operations when aircraft
position accuracy is high. The nominal minimum
aircraft separation distance (expressed in nautical
miles) will be denoted r0 .
2) Degraded operations: Degraded operation con-
sist of all allowable aircraft operations when
aircraft position accuracy is low. The degraded
minimum aircraft separation distance (expressed
in nautical miles) will be denoted rf , with rf > r0.
Radar precision is one of the main reason for deciding
on specific aircraft separation standards. The uncertainty
in the position seen by the controllers leads to a sepa-
ration requirement that can be interpreted as a circle of
avoidance around each aircraft. The circle of avoidance
corresponds to the area around the aircraft where no
other aircraft is allowed. Its radius is generally 2.5 NM
for en-route and 1.5 NM for approach. This separation
distance ensures safety if the position of the aircraft is
relatively well known and regularly updated. Accurate
positioning systems such as ADS-B will probably enable
a reduction in allowable spacing distance [15]. If a failure
happens, the system works in degraded mode, resulting
in an increase in uncertainties on the aircraft position
observed by the controller. As aircraft’s position are
4known less accurately, the resulting radius of avoidance
must be increased. The growth of the avoidance cir-
cle is limited by backup positioning system (Primary
Surveillance Radars, radio...) that enable controllers to
get reports on aircraft’s position. For instance, in the case
of the breakdown of a radar, separation distances must
be increased to procedural separation standards [4]. The
position of the aircraft will be reported by the pilot to
the controller by radio with a low update rate. Between
updates, the position of the aircraft is not known and the
uncertainty on it increases with time.
In the remainder of this paper, we will assume that a
position system failure occurs at time t = 0. Prior to that
time, nominal aircraft position accuracy will translate
into a circle of avoidance with radius r0.
Fig. 2: Track of a growing circle of avoidance
For t ≥ 0, we propose a time-varying model of
position uncertainties, whereby the radius of avoidance
grows from r0 to rf > r0 over a given period of time.
Figure 2 presents the track of a growing circle of avoid-
ance. For instance, r0 can be the radius of avoidance
provided by an ADS-B positioning system, while rf can
be the one provided by a Primary Surveillance Radar
(PSR). In the event of an ADS-B failure, the transition
from r0 and rf must be eventless, in the sense that the
transition should not jeopardize the safety of the overall
traffic.
For each aircraft i, we will assume a constant growth
rate r˙i, such that r(t) = r0 + r˙it. Such a model
approximately captures the growing, but bounded un-
certainty on aircraft position once the navigation system
has failed. Such uncertainty might reflect the effect of
uncertainties on the aircraft heading (denoted ∆θ) and on
the aircraft velocity (denoted ∆Vi). Figure 3 shows the
uncertainty on the trajectory. A simple way to connect
these uncertainties to the growing avoidance radius is to
write, for example,
r˙i = max{Vi sin ∆θ,∆Vi}. (1)
Note this is a conservative approximation.
From these considerations, we see it will not be diffi-
cult to create aircraft configurations which are conflict-
free, yet will rapidly generate conflicts in case of
positioning system degradation. Thus, the ability for
such configurations to gracefully degrade will rely on
∆θ tr&tVi
Vt∆
Fig. 3: Uncertainty on the trajectory
our ability to develop a conflict resolution strategy for
growing aircraft position uncertainties. Figure 4 shows
the difference between a classical conflict avoidance
problem and the problem we are solving. In the classical
avoidance problem, the radius of avoidance is constant.
In our problem, the growing radius of avoidance makes
the formulation and resolution more complicated as it is
time dependent.
(a) Classical conflict avoid-
ance
(b) Growing uncertainties conflict
avoidance
Fig. 4: Conflict avoidance problems comparison
When several aircraft are present within a given
airspace sector, the conflict resolution problem under
degrading position uncertainty becomes much more
complex. An approach using mathematical programming
based on a formulation originally presented in [16] is
introduced in Appendix. The problem is formulated as
a Mixed Integer Linear Program (MILP) and is imple-
mented using the AMPL/CPLEX linear programming
tool suite [17], [18].
III. FREE FLIGHT VERSUS MILES-IN-TRAIL
ANALYSIS
The parts of airspace where the highest aircraft den-
sities occur are the terminal areas in the vicinity of
airports. Therefore, these constitute an ideal setting for
evaluating the ability for traffic to undergo graceful
degradation. This choice is also motivated by current
vistas on future operations in terminal areas, which
have been named “Super-Density operations” (NextGen)
and “High Complexity Terminal operations” (SESAR).
Both consist of increasing the airspace capacity around
busy airports. A solution proposed in SESAR [3] is
5the multiple merge points arrival operation shown in
Figure 5). One way to interpret this solution is to
assimilate the new mode of operation to a “Free-Flight”
scenario, whereby the route structure in the terminal area
is relaxed and the only constraint on incoming aircraft is
to meet a specific arrival time at the merge point. This
scenario contrasts sharply with current airport arrival
practices, where high-density arrival flows of aircraft are
organized tens or even hundred of miles prior to landing,
by lining up aircraft along arrival routes and spacing
them appropriately. Such operations are often denoted
Miles-In-Trail (MIT) operations.
Therefore we believe it is interesting and worthwhile
to compare the ability for both operations, denoted
Free-Flight (FF) and miles-in trail (MIT) to undergo
graceful degradation of the navigation system. For that
Fig. 5: Arrival Routes, Multiple Merge Points [3]
purpose, we consider a simplified scenario that involve 8
aircraft merging to a common point of coordinates (0, 0).
We assume that all aircraft are Time Based Separated
(TBS): Each aircraft is given an arrival time so as to
meet a precise and regular arrival rate at the merge
point. Assuming all aircraft fly at the same speed of
200kt, the aircraft must therefore be initially located
on regularly spaced circles centered at the merge point.
The inter-aircraft spacings are designed to emulate fu-
ture Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC) arrival
operations on closely spaced parallel runways, such as
San Francisco Airport: As observed in [19], the average
interarrival time for each runway is slightly less than 2
minutes. This translates into a 3Nm average separation
between aircraft when they fly at 200kt and the two
runways are in use. This separation also turns out to be
a very conservative estimate of separation requirements
for satellite-based navigation systems [15], leading us
to an initial circle of avoidance of radius r0 = 1.5NM
as proposed by ICAO for ADS-B[20]. The final radius
of avoidance was chosen to be rf = 2.5NM to reflect
the surveillance degradation that would occur, should
a GPS-based surveillance fail and backup radar-based
technology had to be used. The rate of growth reflects a
heading uncertainty ∆θ = 5◦. Hence, r˙ = 0.29NM/min.
The transition time between r0 and rf is T = 3.44min.
The goal of this study is to evaluate the impact of
changing arrival operations from Mile-In-Trail towards
Free Flight. For that purpose, we consider an “arrival
cone” whose vertex is at the merge point. When the
cone’s angular width is zero or takes small values, it cor-
responds to highly structured Miles-In-Trail operations.
When the cone’s angular width is large, it corresponds
to less structured, Free-Flight-like operations.
The remainder of our study consists of understanding
the impact of the cone angular width and the aircraft ini-
tial separations on traffic degradation, should a surveil-
lance system failure occur. The cone angular width was
varied from 10◦ to 60◦. The initial aircraft separation,
that is, the distance between two consecutive circles, was
chosen to be 3.5NM. 1650 cases with different arrival
angles have been simulated. The following procedure
has been used to generate the cases: Since we know the
distance of each aircraft to the merging point (fixed sep-
aration distance), the aircraft initial heading was picked
at random, using a uniform probability distribution in
the allowed interval (±5◦, ±10◦, . . .). Figure 6 presents
two configurations: MIT and FF. The circles represent
the avoidance circles (red = FF, black = MIT) and have
initial radius 1.5NM and are centered on the aircraft.
The blue line shows aircraft’s heading. Aircraft are
represented by a small circle for the MIT configuration
and asterisks for FF configuration. The allowed arrival
cone for the FF configuration is depicted in light blue.
Fig. 6: Free Flight and Miles-In-Trail arrival configurations
To analyze the impact of a surveillance system degra-
dation, these traffic configurations have been used as
6initial condition for the conflict resolution algorithm
under uncertainties developed in appendix. Let S be the
index set of all generated cases. The severity of the
traffic management degradation on the traffic situation
s ∈ S was evaluated by measuring the average deviation
ms required for each aircraft, denoting θis0 the initial
heading of aircraft i and θi its heading after resolution
in this situation.
ms =
∑n
i=1 |θis − θis0|
n
, (2)
where n is the number of aircraft. All the cases were then
sorted by absolute value of the maximum aircraft arrival
angle and grouped in parameter increments of 2.5◦.
G5 = {s ∈ S such that max
i
{θis0} ∈ [0, 5), i = 1 . . . n},
Gk = {s ∈ S such that max
i
{θis0} ∈ [k − 1, k), . . .
i = 1 . . . n}, k = 7.5, 10, 12.5, . . . , 30.
(3)
Figure 7 presents the results of the analysis. The
maximum deviation ms experienced within each group
was plotted as a function of the corresponding maximum
aircraft arrival angle.
Fig. 7: Evolution of the worst deviation required.
Although the figure suffers from sampling irregulari-
ties, the following general trend may be observed: As the
arrival cone increases, the aircraft deviations required to
ensure a conflict free configuration increases 33%. For
an arrival angle less than 5◦, the maximum deviation
required is 10.6◦ per aircraft, while it is 14.2◦ for a
maximum arrival angle less than 30◦. Figures 8 and 9
show the avoidance maneuvers for the worst cases of G5
and G30 with 3.5NM initial separation. Figure 8(a) and
9(a) present the configuration at t = 0. Aircraft are at
the postion where the avoidance maneuver is calculated.
The trajectories of t < 0 are represented and the line
pointing out of the aircraft represent the new aircraft’s
heading.
Free Flight or Miles-In-Trail do not appear to be sig-
nificantly different from the stand point of surveillance
degradation. However, these conclusions were reached
using computer-based conflict management which may
differ from human-based conflict management.
(a) t = 0min
(b) t = 3min
Fig. 8: Avoidance maneuvers for the worst case of G5
IV. CONCLUSION
This paper has outlined the principle of graceful
degradation of air traffic operations in the face of Com-
munication, Navigation or Surveillance system failures.
Following a generic description of graceful degrada-
tion requirements and interpreting it in the context of
safety, we have introduced a specific problem of graceful
degradation that examines the impact of failures of
the surveillance system on airborne traffic separation
assurance. Considering current Miles-In-Trail and future
Free-Flight approach scenarios, we have shown that free-
flight-like airport approaches do not degrade significantly
more than current Miles-In-Trail scenarios when facing
failures of the surveillance system. During the process of
this study, we have developed a new conflict resolution
tool that applies to the transient conditions encountered
during failures of the surveillance system.
7(a) t = 0min
(b) t = 3min
Fig. 9: Avoidance maneuvers for the worst case of G30
APPENDIX
AN ALGORITHM FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION UNDER
UNCERTAINTIES
The following appendix presents the algorithm used
to solve the problem of conflict resolution when several
aircraft are present. We decided to formulate the problem
as a Mixed Integer Linear Program (MILP) as it is an
efficient way to solve optimization problems. A typical
MILP looks like:
min
x,z
fT1 x+ f
T
2 z (A-1)
subject to A1x+A2z ≤ b (A-2)
(A-3)
where f1 ∈ Rm, f2 ∈ Rn, x ∈ Rm, z ∈ {0, 1}n. A1 ∈
Rm×m, A2 ∈ Rn×n, b ∈ Rm+n. In what follows we will
focus our attention on developing a MILP model for the
conflict resolution problem of interest in this paper.
We consider a set of n aircraft in a planar space.
Each aircraft aci, i = 1, · · · , n is defined by its position
(xi, yi), its heading θi and its speed Vi.
The relative velocity V ij and speed Vij of aircraft i
with respect to aircraft j, and the distance Dij between
aircraft are given by:
V ij = [(Vxi − Vxj ), (Vyi − Vyj )]T (A-4)
= [Vi cos θi − Vj cos θj , Vi sin θi − Vj sin θj ]T ,
(A-5)
Vij =
√
(Vi cos θi−Vj cos θj)2+(Vi sin θi−Vj sin θj)2,
(A-6)
Dij =
√
(xi − xj)2 + (yi − yj)2. (A-7)
See also Figure A-1. Let us define some useful param-
eters for the avoidance problem. Let θij be the angle
between the relative velocity V ij and the x-axis, ωij be
the angle between the connector of the aircraft and the x-
axis. Finally, let γij be the angle between the connector
of the aircraft and a line starting from aircraft aci and
tangent to a circle of radius 2r and centered at aircraft
acj . We have:
θij = arctan
Vyij
Vxij
(A-8)
= arctan
Vi sin θi − Vj sin θj
Vi cos θi − Vj cos θj (A-9)
ωij = arctan
yj − yi
xj − xi (A-10)
γij = arcsin
2r
Dij
, (A-11)
Fig. A-1: Problem configuration
A. Problem structure
We propose to solve the conflict resolution problem
arising in this paper using a single heading change. The
originality of our problem lies with the fact that the
allowable miss distance between the two aircraft is time-
dependent. Namely, at time t = 0, the minimum miss
distance is 2r0. For 0 ≤ t ≤ T , the minimum miss
distance grows from 2r0 to 2rf . T is given by
T =
rf − r0
r˙
, (A-12)
8where r˙ is the growing rate of the circle of avoidance.
For t ≥ T , the miss distance is constant and equal to 2rf .
Figure A-2 illustrates the conflict avoidance constraint in
a relative frame of reference. For no conflict to occur,
the circle C of radius 2r0 and centered on aircraft acj
must not intersect the area enclosed by the contour C2.
This contour C2 can be seen to be the union of the half
line P1, the circular segment P3 and the line segment
P2 and their symmetric images across the line passing
though aci and parallel to the velocity V ij .
Fig. A-2: Avoidance constraints
For the purpose of linearization, we approximate the
countour C2 by means of line segments, not to be
intersected by the circle C. The first, obvious linear
approximation is to ask that the circle C not intersect
either the gray stripe in figure A-2, or the hatched cone
whose vertex is aci.
• Asking that the circle C not intersect the gray stripe
is a classical conflict avoidance problem that was
developed and solved by Pallottino in [16]. This
problem deals for time t ≥ T , when enough time
has elapsed for the two radii of avoidance to be
equal to rf . The avoidance problem presented in
figure A-2 consists of finding a change in heading
for aircraft i and j such that the line parallel to
V ij and tangent to the circle of radius 2(rf − r0)
centered on the relative position of aircraft i to
aircraft j at T , does not intersect the circle of radius
2r0 centered on acj . This problem is equivalent to
the line directed along V ij and passing by aircraft i
does not intersect a circle of radius 2rf and centered
on acj . The avoidance constraints are then:
θij − ωij > γ˜ij
or
θij − ωij < −γ˜ij
(A-13)
where
γ˜ij = arcsin
2rf
Dij
, (A-14)
• Asking that the circle C not intersect the hatched
cone can be detailed as follows, referring back to
figure A-2. The angular width 2αij of the cone
depends on the relative velocity of the aircraft:
sinαij =
r˙i + r˙j
Vij
. (A-15)
If r˙i + r˙j > Vij , the sum of the radii of the
avoidance circles increases faster than the aircraft
go away from each other. Whatever the relative
velocity, the circles are bound to intersect each
other. Hence, the cone of avoidance is the entire
plan: as arcsinαij is not defined, we set αij = pi.
If r˙i + r˙j = Vij , the increase rate of the circle of
avoidance is the same as the relative speed. Hence,
the avoidance cone is a half plane perpendicular to
the relative velocity, αij = pi2 . The distance between
the circles of avoidance will remain the same. The
Fig. A-3: Configuration in the relative frame of reference:
cone avoidance
condition of avoidance between two aircraft is given
by a condition on angles, for −pi2 ≤ ωij ≤ pi2 :
θij − ωij − αij > γˆij
or
θij − ωij + αij < −γˆij
(A-16)
where
γˆij = arcsin
2r0
Dij
, (A-17)
Figure A-3 presents those avoidance constraints. To
avoid any singularity due to angles around ±pi, we
ensure that −pi2 ≤ ωij ≤ pi2 . To do so, aircraft are
ordered in function of their position (xi, yi) so that
9we get: x1 ≤ x2 ≤ . . . ≤ xn and if xi = xi+1,
yi < yi+1.
The description of the avoidance constraints could be
left at that point. However, the developed constraints
are somewhat conservative. For example, as shown in
figure A-4, the circle C may intersect the cone and
the gray stripe without intersecting C2. To improve the
solution, we may introduce a new constraint. Ideally, we
would like to introduce the tangent (`1) to C2 at point
A. In the relative frame of reference, `1 has a slope
θij − αij2 . `1 not intersecting C2 is equivalent to `3 not
intersecting the circle centered on aircraft j and of radius
(2r0 + |AD|). To formulate the constraint, we need the
distance |AD|, between points A and D. This distance
is 2(rf−r0)−VijT sin αij2 . This distance is a non linear
function of θi and θj as Vij and αij are non linear with
respect to θi and θj . This function depends on too many
parameters to be linearized easily. Nevertheless, we can
approximate this constraint by using a line `2: the line of
slope θij − αij2 passing through a point between A and
B. For that, we need to find a majorant to |DA|. The
following geometrical development gives this majorant:
D is the middle of EB and A ∈ [DB].
Fig. A-4: Geometry of the curved-part constraint (P3)
ED =
EB
2
(A-18)
>
EA
2
(A-19)
= rf − r0. (A-20)
Hence, we get
DA = EA− ED (A-21)
< rf − r0. (A-22)
This leads to the constraint of the line of slope αij2 not
intersecting the circle of radius 2r0 +
rf−r0
2 = r0 + rf :

θij − ωij − αij2 > γ
∗
ij
or
θij − ωij + αij2 < −γ
∗
ij
(A-23)
where γ∗ij is given by
γ∗ij = arcsin
r0 + rf
Dij
. (A-24)
As visible on figure A-4, this constraint improves the
solution by allowing some solutions where the circle C
was intersecting the first two constraints.
B. Optimization of the conflict resolution
In the previous section, we have presented constraints
that should be satisfied by the aircraft headings to avoid
a conflict. These constraints may be incorporated in an
optimal conflict resolution scheme. Denoting the initial
heading θi0 of the aircraft i and θi its heading after
resolution, the problem is to compute:
min J(θ1, θ2, . . . θn) = min
∑
i=1...n
|θi − θ0i|, (A-25)
subject to
For all aircraft i = 1 . . . n− 1,
For all aircraft j = i+ 1 . . . n

θij − ωij > γ˜ij
and
θij − ωij < −γ˜ij
or
θij − ωij − αij > γˆij
and
θij − ωij + αij < −γˆij
or
θij − ωij − αij2 > γ
∗
ij
and
θij − ωij + αij2 < −γ
∗
ij
(A-26)
where γ˜ij , γˆij and γ∗ij , are given by equations A-14,
A-17 and A-24, respectively.
C. Identical speeds case
For the sake of computing simplicity, we assume
all aircraft share the same speed V . This assumption
simplifies the formulae for θij and αij and allows us to
obtain piecewise linear approximations.
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1) Expression of the angle of the relative velocity: θij:
Using the assumption of identical speed, the angle be-
tween the relative velocity and the x-axis, the expression
of θij given by equation A-9 can be simplified :
θij = arctan
sin θi − sin θj
cos θi − cos θj
= arctan
sin( θi−θj2 ) cos(
θi+θj
2 )
− sin( θi−θj2 ) sin( θi+θj2 )
.
(A-27)
θij is a function of θi + θj and θi− θj . It can be shown
that θij is a piecewise affine function of θi+θj and θi−θj
of the form θij = mij(θi + θj) + pij . The value of mij
if always 12 and the values taken by pij are summarized
in table A-1.
We can determine the value of pij using
boolean variables. Let bCaseDiffPosij ,
bCaseSumInfmPiij , bCaseSumSupPiij , bCase1ij
and bCase4ij be boolean variables such that:
bCaseDiffPosij = 1⇐⇒ θi − θj ≥ 0 (A-28)
bCaseSumInfmPiij = 1⇐⇒ −2pi ≤ θi + θj < −pi
(A-29)
bCaseSumSupPiij = 1⇐⇒ pi ≤ θi + θj < 2pi
(A-30)
bCase1ij = 1⇐⇒

bCaseDiffPosij = 0
and
bCaseSumInfmPiij = 1
(A-31)
bCase4ij = 1⇐⇒

bCaseDiffPosij = 1
and
bCaseSumSupPiij = 1
(A-32)
(A-33)
Those 3 boolean variables yield the following expres-
sion for pij and hence θij :
pij=(bCaseSumPosij− 12 )pi+2pi(bCase1ij−bCase4ij),
(A-34)
θij =
θi + θj
2
+ (bCaseDiffPosij − 12 )pi + . . .
2pi(bCase1ij − bCase4ij), (A-35)
which is linear in θi and θj and in the boolean variables.
2) Constraints formulation for θij: The following
formulation uses the big-M method. M is a large
number such that if multiplied by a boolean set to 1,
the constraint is always satisfied, whatever the value of
the other variables. This enables us to select between
constraints and use or relationship between constraints.
This is a standard procedure described [21].
Determination of the sign of θi − θj :
bCaseDiffPosij = 1⇐⇒{
θi − θj −MbCaseDiffPosij < 0,
−θi + θj −M(1− bCaseDiffPosij) < 0.
(A-36)
Determination of the boolean bCaseSumInfmPiij if
θi + θj < −pi:
bCaseSumInfmPiij = 1⇐⇒{
θi + θj + pi −M(1− bCaseSumInfmPiij) < 0,
−θi − θj − pi −MbCaseSumInfmPiij < 0.
(A-37)
Determination if θi + θj ≥ pi:
bCaseSumInfmPiij = 1⇐⇒{
−θi − θj + pi −M(1− bCaseSumSupPiij) ≤ 0,
θi + θj − pi −MbCaseSumSupPiij ≤ 0.
(A-38)
Determination of the boolean bCase1ij :
bCase1ij = 1⇐⇒
−1.5 + bCaseDiffPosij − . . .
bCaseSumInfmPiij + 2bCase1ij ≤ 0,
−0.5− 2bCaseDiffPosij . . .
+bCaseSumInfmPiij − bCase1ij ≤ 0, .
(A-39)
Determination of the boolean bCase4ij :
bCase4ij = 1⇐⇒
1.5− bCaseDiffPosij − bCaseSumSupPiij . . .
−2(1− bCase4ij) ≤ 0,
−1.5 + bCaseDiffPosij + bCaseSumSupPiij . . .
−bCase4ij ≤ 0.
(A-40)
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3) Cone angular width 2αij in the relative frame of
reference: This section presents the formulas to deter-
mine the cone angular width 2αij when aircraft share
an identical speed. The assumption leads to r˙i = r˙, i =
1 . . . n and
αij = arcsin
2r˙√
V 2(cos θi− cos θj)2+V 2(sin θi− sin θj)2
= arcsin
r˙
V | sin( θi−θj2 )|
= arcsin
tan ∆θ
| sin( θi−θj2 )|
(A-41)
The half cone angular width αij is given by equation
(A-41) and it is a non linear function of θi − θj . This
function is symmetric about θi − θj = 0 and consists of
two quasi convex components, separated at θi− θj = 0,
as shown in Figure A-5. The epigraph of each of these
quasi convex components can be approximated by the
intersection of linear constraints defined by their slopes
ak and intercepts bk. Using the big-M method allows
us to account for the presence of two disconnected
components, and this linearization leads to:
Fig. A-5: αij function of θi − θj and the linearization used
a1(θi − θj) + b1 −MbCaseAlphaPosij ≤ αij
a2(θi − θj) + b2 −MbCaseAlphaPosij ≤ αij
...
al(θi − θj) + bl −MbCaseAlphaPosij ≤ αij
− a1(θi − θj) + b1 −M(1− bCaseAlphaPosij) ≤ αij
− a2(θi − θj) + b2 −M(1− bCaseAlphaPosij) ≤ αij
...
− al(θi − θj) + bl −M(1− bCaseAlphaPosij) ≤ αij
(A-42)
with bCaseAlphaPosij a binary variable used to trans-
form the or between the constraints in an and relation-
ship.
The avoidance constraints are now given by:
− θi+θj2 − ( 12 − bCaseP lusij)pi + ωij + αij . . .
+γˆij −MbCaseIneqPosij < 0
and
θi+θj
2 + (
1
2 − bCaseP lusij)pi − ωij + αij . . .
+γˆij −M(1− bCaseIneqPosij) < 0
(A-43)
with bCaseIneqPosij a binary variable used to trans-
form the or between the constraints in an and relation-
ship.
4) Mixed constraints for conflict avoidance: The
conflict avoidance constraints given by equation A-26
can be handled in a linear programming framework by
using the big-M method, leading to the following mixed
constraints:

− θi+θj2 − ( 12 − bCaseP lusij)pi + ωij + γ˜ijr0 . . .
−MbCaseIneqPosij −Mb1ij < 0
θi+θj
2 + (
1
2 − bCaseP lusij)pi − ωij + γ˜ijr0 . . .
−M(1− bCaseIneqPosij)−Mb1ij < 0
− θi+θj2 − ( 12 − bCaseP lusij)pi + ωij + αij + γˆijrf . . .
−MbCaseIneqPosij −Mb2ij < 0
θi+θj
2 + (
1
2 − bCaseP lusij)pi − ωij + αij + γˆijrf . . .
−M(1− bCaseIneqPosij)−Mb2ij < 0
− θi+θj2 − ( 12 − bCaseP lusij)pi + ωij + αij2 + γ∗ijrf . . .
−MbCaseIneqPosij −Mb3ij < 0
θi+θj
2 + (
1
2 − bCaseP lusij)pi − ωij + αij2 + γ∗ijrf . . .
−M(1− bCaseIneqPosij)−Mb3ij < 0
b1ij + b2ij + b3ij = 2
(A-44)
with b1ij , b2ij and b3ij binary variables.
The global algorithm consists on minimizing expres-
sion A-25 subject to all the constraints previously devel-
oped. We wrote the constraints in an AMPL format and
solved using CPLEX. MATLAB was used to generate
the 1650 cases and was also used for the post-processing.
The computing time to solve an 8 aircraft configuration
ranged from less than a second to dozen of seconds on
a 4-processor, Pentium class computer.
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Ref Line Reference Issue
R-6 In addition, backup
functions are
distributed throughout
the system, and
there are layers of
protection to allow for
graceful degradation of
services in the event of
automation failures.
Develop guidance for what
flexibility is allowed in the im-
plementation of airborne sepa-
ration management algorithms
to ensure operationally con-
sistent results, understanding
whether variations in algo-
rithms can result in major
impacts on overall operations.
R-9 C-ATM is the means
by which flight
operator objectives are
balanced with overall
NAS performance
objectives and
accomplishes many of
the objectives for CM,
FCM, and TM.
Super Density operations will
result in many aircraft in
close proximity. Consequently
an aircraft deviating from its
assigned trajectory is much
more likely to cause an im-
mediate conflict with another
aircraft, and safe avoidance
maneuvers may be limited
or unavailable. How can su-
per density operations be con-
ducted safely, especially in the
presence of severe weather?
R-10 C-ATM is the means
by which flight
operator objectives are
balanced with overall
NAS performance
objectives and
accomplishes many of
the objectives for CM,
FCM, and TM.
Develop requirements for a
collision avoidance system
that is compatible with
NextGen tactical separation?
Unless mandated otherwise,
some aircraft will likely
be equipped with legacy
TCAS/ACAS systems which
may generate unwanted alerts
during normal operations. How
should this be accounted for?
R-28 In all, these new kinds
of flight operations
dramatically improve
en route productivity
and capacity and are
essential to achieving
NextGen.
If the automation fails,
what is the backup
plan in terms of peo-
ple/procedures/automation?
R-44 As illustrated in
Figure 1, superdensity
corridors handle
arriving and departing
traffic, while much
nearby airspace
remains available to
other traffic.
We do not prove today’s ATC
system is safe, but rely on
historical data. NextGen will
be required to both be safe
and to demonstrate it is safe.
How will safety be designed
into all aspects of NextGen
and then proven?
P-1 In addition, backup
functions are
distributed throughout
the system, and
there are layers of
protection to allow for
graceful degradation of
services in the event of
automation failures.
Develop policies concerning li-
ability for delegated separa-
tion and self-separation oper-
ations.
TABLE 2: NextGen research and policies issues (Part 2)
Case 1 θi − θj < 0 and −2pi ≤ θi + θj < −pi pij = 3pi2
Case 2 θi − θj < 0 and −pi ≤ θi + θj < 2pi pij = −pi2
Case 3 θi − θj ≥ 0 and −2pi ≤ θi + θj < pi pij = pi2
Case 4 θi − θj ≥ 0 and pi ≤ θi + θj < 2pi pij = − 3pi2
TABLE A-1: Intercept coefficient of θij
